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Abstract 
In this paper, we take a new look at the effects of the subsidy policy and the 
government’s R&D activities in an R&D-based growth model. The government not 
only subsidizes the R&D cost of the firms but also engages in R&D activities and, in 
addition, levies a specific tax on the firms producing the final and the intermediate 
goods, respectively, in order to finance the expenditure. We find that in the economy 
there exist two balanced equilibrium growth paths. In an economy with a high growth 
path, the government’s subsidy policy and its R&D activities will crowd out the 
private R&D activities, and hence the fiscal policies are of no help to the economic 
growth. In other words, the intermediate goods firms play an important role in driving 
the economic growth. By contrast, in an economy with a low growth path, the 
government that directly engages in R&D activities plays an important role in 
economic growth. The fiscal policies of the government have a positive effect on the 
economic growth.  
 
Keywords: Government’s R&D activities, Specific tax, Subsidy policy, Endogenous 
growth, R&D 
JEL classification: L00; O41; O30 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The role of the government cannot be ignored in the endogenous growth model, and 
accordingly in the 1990s there was an explosion of research on the growth effects of 
several government activities. In the R&D-driven endogenous growth models, Romer 
(1990), Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt 
(1992), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) all find that R&D subsidies encourage 
firms to devote more resources to R&D activities and as a result there is an increasing 
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rate of economic growth in the long run. Jones and Williams (1998, 2000) point out 
that the decentralized economy typically under-invests in R&D when compared to 
what is socially optimal when using data for the US economy.1 Recently, some of the 
theoretical literature, such as Davidson and Segerstrom (1998), Segerstrom (2000), 
and Zeng and Zhang (2007) that discusses the role of government policy in the field 
of the R&D-based endogenous growth model, has focused on subsidies for R&D 
because monopoly pricing and knowledge spillovers may result in too little private 
R&D. Şener (2008) studies the determinants of an optimal R&D policy, under a wide 
range of empirically relevant calibrations and finds that the subsidy rate turns out to 
be positive and to fluctuate between 5% and 25%. 
This paper focuses on the financial resources that come in the form of subsidies 
out of government revenue. Most of the papers that consider tax policies in the 
context of an R&D-based growth model2 or subsidy policies financed by tax revenue 
usually introduce ad valorem taxation (i.e., a tax proportional to the firm’s 
revenue/profit) to research the tax effect, in addition to Futagami and Doi (2004) who 
investigate a specific tax or unit tax (i.e., a tax proportional to the firm’s output) 
against the backdrop of economic growth, but they do not discuss the subsidy policy 
in relation to economic growth. It is well known that, in the R&D-driven endogenous 
growth model, the monopoly profit serves as an engine of economic growth. In this 
model, the tax incidence under imperfect competition not only gives rise to a price 
effect, but also to a profit effect that impacts the economic growth. Hence, the tax 
incidence and subsidy policy in relation to the R&D activities plays an important role 
in driving the endogenous growth model. 
A large number of studies in the taxation literature, including Suits and 
Musgrave (1953), Stern (1987), Hamilton (1999), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1987), 
Delipalla and Keen (1992), Myles (1996), Keen (1998), Anderson et al. (2001a), 
Schröder (2004), and Pirttilä (2002), investigate the relative efficiency of specific 
taxes and ad valorem taxes under an imperfectly competitive static analysis, for 
example, under Cournot competition and Bertrand competition, and their effect on 
social welfare. They show that there is a welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes over 
specific taxes under imperfect competition. In particular, ad valorem taxation leads to 
the lower consumer price of a good even though firms would exit the market in a 
monopolistic competition case (Schröder, 2004). These studies almost all focus on 
social welfare, but not on the economic growth. However, an important point of view 
regarding ad valorem taxation is that there is an increase in firms exiting the market as 
compared to a specific tax and the lower firm profits that result. In such an instance, 
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an ad valorem tax is no longer better than a specific tax in the case of the R&D-based 
endogenous growth model since the economic growth is derived from the monopoly 
profit due to innovation needs. Because the profits induce the intermediate goods 
firms to engage in R&D activities, the increase in R&D activities will cause the 
economy to grow. 
On the other hand, Besley (1989) indicates that the output per firm is enhanced 
by an increase in a specific tax on output if the inverse demand function is convex. 
Anderson et al. (2001b) show that unit taxation can be welfare-superior in the long 
run when the market is characterized by Bertrand competition with differentiated 
products. Doi and Futagami (2004) also introduce a monopolistic competition model 
in which consumers have a variety of preferences and which shows that a specific tax 
increases social welfare and that the optimal tax rule is contrary to the inverse 
elasticity rule. Kitahara and Matsumura (2006) investigate how a specific tax and an 
ad valorem tax affect equilibrium location choice in a model of product differentiation 
which includes Hotelling and Vickrey-Salop spatial models. They find that the 
specific tax affects neither of the firms’ equilibrium location, output quantity, or 
profits. However, the number of firms is a key point in R&D-driven endogenous 
growth models because the more firms there are in the intermediate goods market, 
namely, the more variety there is, the more the economy grows. Hence, the analysis of 
the specific tax which is the government’s revenue in a dynamic framework 
associated with economic growth differs from an ad valorem tax which is discussed in 
traditional theory and thus becomes more interesting.  
In this paper, we would like to extend Wang et al. (2010) and to take a new look 
at the effects of tax and subsidy policies and the government’s R&D activities in an 
R&D-based growth model. Let us consider a government that imposes a specific tax 
on both final goods and intermediate goods to finance the subsidies and expenditure 
on R&D activities. Under a successively monopolistic competition model this paper 
in following Wang et al. (2010) deals with franchise contract bargaining for vertical 
integration, a subsidy to reduce the R&D cost of the firms and increase the 
government’s R&D activities due to the too few private R&D activities in a 
decentralized economy, and a specific tax to correct the market power of the producer.  
We present a four-period model. In the first period, the government levies 
specific taxes on final goods and intermediate goods to finance the government 
expenditure, to engage in R&D activities and to subsidize the R&D costs of the firms. 
In the second period, the final goods firms and the intermediate goods firms bargain 
over the franchise contract including over the franchise fee and the price of the 
intermediate goods according to Nash efficient bargaining. In other words, the 
upstream and downstream industries will vertically integrate to eliminate the double 
 4 
marginalization through the franchise contract. In the third period, the final goods 
firms determine the prices of the final goods to maximize their profits. In the fourth 
period, the consumers decide the expenditure plan to maximize their utility. We 
proceed by solving the model backward. 
 
2. The Model 
The model is an extension of the endogenous growth model with the increasing 
variety model of Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 3) and Wang et al. (2010). 
We consider an imperfectly competitive final goods market and the government not 
only implements a tax/subsidy policy but also engages in R&D activities. There are 
four agents in this model, the household, the final goods producers, the intermediate 
goods firms and the government. In this model, R&D investment creates new types of 
intermediate goods for final production. The price of intermediate goods is 
determined by the negotiation between the intermediate goods firms and final goods 
firms. The government levies a specific tax to finance the subsidy for too little R&D 
and engages in R&D activities. The household chooses a consumption/investment 
plan. 
 
2.1 Households 
The individuals supply labor service, L , that is supplied inelastically, and 
consumption loans in competitive labor and imperfectly competitive product markets. 
The representative household’s preferences are defined over an infinite horizon  
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Eqs. (1) and (2) indicate that utility is a unitary elasticity function and is discounted 
by a constant pure rate of time preference ρ .3 C  is a composite consumption good 
which consists of a bundle of closely-related product varieties according to Eq. (3). 
This type of monopolistic competition CES functional form follows Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977), m  is the number of different varieties, and jc  is a consumption good of 
variety j . Commodities supplied by different producers are imperfect substitutes 
with constant elasticity of substitution σ . [ ]mj ,0∈  represents the varieties 
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produced by different downstream firms. 
    The budget constraint, which describes how the household invests the new assets, 
is equal to the rate of return r  earned on assets and total labor income plus the profit 
the household receives from the downstream firms minus total spending on 
consumption goods. It is therefore given by 
    EmwLraa −Π++=&  (4) 
where  
djcpPCE m
j jj∫ === 0   (5) 
E  is total spending on consumption goods, and P  is the aggregate consumption 
price index. jp  is the after-tax price of consumption good j . w  is the wage rate 
which is common to all sectors in the economy since labor is assumed to be perfectly 
mobile. Π  is the after-tax profits of the firms of the final goods sector. a  is the 
household assets which is the value of the stock of the blueprints, npa A=  and 
AA pnnpa &&& += , where Ap  is the after-subsidy cost or price of a new blueprint n& . 
Therefore, the budget constraint may be rewritten as  
PCmwLnrppnnp AAA −Π++=+ &&  (6) 
First, the representative household chooses the optimal consumption and 
investment plan to maximize its discounted utility, Eq. (1), subject to the budget 
constraint, Eq. (6). The current-value Hamiltonian associated with this decision 
problem is given by 
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where λ  is the co-state variable for n . The first-order conditions are4 
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By combining these two expressions, we obtain the Keynes-Ramsey rule: 
    
P
P
r
C
C &&
−−= ρ  (10) 
Secondly, the household chooses its consumption levels for each available 
product variety, jc , in order to maximize the utility of Eq. (2), given the definition of 
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composite consumption in Eq. (3) and the budget constraint in Eq. (5). The solutions 
for the consumption of variety j  are obtained: 
    C
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Eq. (11) gives the downward-sloping demand curve for goods jc  which is faced by 
the final goods firms. Eq. (12) expresses the aggregate consumption price index. 
 
2.2 The Final Goods Sector 
We consider a production economy with imperfectly competitive product markets. 
The consumption goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms. Each 
consumption good is supposed to be produced by a single firm, that is, m  also 
represents the number of firms which produce industry j  goods. Therefore, a 
composite final good Y  which is equal to consumption goods, Eq. (3), can be 
represented as 
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Y  is produced by monopolistically competitive firms. Each firm produces jy  by 
using a continuum of intermediate goods ix . According to Spence (1976) and Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977), the production function of firm j  is 
α
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where ijx  represents the amount of intermediate goods i  used by firm j . Each 
intermediate good ix  is produced by a single firm, and intermediate goods are not 
perfect substitutes. [ ])(,0 tni ∈  is the range of intermediate goods existing at time t .  
)1(1 α−−  represents the elasticity of substitution between final goods. 
    The producer j  in the final goods sector chooses a price to maximize its profit 
j
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subject to the demand function in Eq. (11) and the clearness condition for the final 
goods market, jj cy = . jq  is the price of the final goods, ijpˆ  is the after-tax price 
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of the intermediate goods i , and jf  represents the franchise fee that the final goods 
producer j  has to pay to the upstream firm in order to obtain the right and 
know-how to produce the final good by using these intermediated goods. 
    We assume that the government levies a specific tax on each final good and 
intermediate good, and that each tax is constant over time for analytical simplicity. 
The consumption goods price and the intermediate goods price become 
yjj qp τ+=  (16) 
xx
ijij pp τ+=ˆ  (17) 
where yτ  represents the specific tax imposed on the final goods and is the same for 
all j . xτ  represents the specific tax imposed on the intermediate goods i  and is 
the same for all i . 
From the perspective of symmetry, we have jij xx = , 
x
j
x
ij pp = , i∀ , in 
equilibrium. The production function in Eq. (14) becomes jj xny α= . Then we 
substitute jjij ynxx
α−
== , jj cy =  into Eq. (15) and subject to Eqs. (16) and (17). 
The maximizing profit function of firm j  becomes 
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To maximize the profit, the typical final goods firm j  will charge a 
monopolistic markup price to the consumers as follows 
1
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The pricing rule depends on the elasticity of substitution (σ ) of the final goods firms, 
the prices of intermediate goods ( xjp ), and the specific taxes ( xτ , yτ ). Then the 
consumption goods price becomes 
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    Substituting Eq. (19) into Eq. (18) yields the profit function of a typical 
downstream firm j   
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2.3 The Intermediate Goods and the R&D Sectors 
The typical intermediate firm produces its differentiated goods with a technology that 
requires one unit of labor per unit of intermediate goods ( xii lx = ). Each intermediate 
goods firm produces and sells a slightly unique variety of goods ix  to each final 
goods firm to maximize its profit since the good is protected by an infinitely-lived 
patent, taking the actions of all other producers in the intermediate goods sector as 
given 
j
x
ii
x
ii mfwlxp +−=pi  (22) 
where xil  is the amount of labor used by firm i , and if  is the franchise fee 
received from the final goods firm. Since a variety ix  is needed by the final goods 
firms and the production function of the final goods firms is ( jj xny α= ), we have 
j
x
i ymnl
α−
=  to substitute into Eq. (22). In addition, since jj cy = , the profit function 
of intermediate goods in Eq. (22) may be re-presented as 
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R&D technology is such that, to develop a new idea, a researcher needs a 
quantity of labor to develop ideas. The production function in the R&D sector is given 
by 
AnLn =&  (24) 
where AL  is the amount of labor hired in the R&D sector which is from the R&D 
firms ( RL ) and the government sector ( GL ), AAGRA LvvLLLL )1( −+=+= , v  is the 
proportion of labor employed in the R&D sector between the R&D firms and the 
government, n&  is the number of new blueprints created for a given period of time, 
and n  refers to the positive spillovers in the production of blueprints. The more 
workers the R&D sector employs or the more varieties of goods the intermediate 
goods market has, the more new blueprints are produced per unit of time. 
    The research sector’s after-subsidy profit flow is given by 
AAA wLsvnp )1( −−= &pi  (25) 
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where s  is a fraction of all research expenses paid by the government. Such a 
subsidy to R&D lowers the private cost. By substituting the production function, Eq. 
(24), into Eq. (25) and due to the property of perfect competition in the R&D sector 
( 0=Api ), the blueprint cost or value is as follows 
n
wsvpA
)1( −
=  (26) 
Eq. (26) indicates that the value of the blueprint is equal to its cost. 
    Anyone can have free entry into the business of being an inventor as long as the 
R&D cost secures the net present value of the profit in intermediate goods, that is  
∫
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    Differentiating the free entry condition in Eq. (27) with respect to time,5 we 
obtain 
A
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A p
p
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where pi  is the profit flow given by Eq. (23). Eq. (28) is a non-arbitrage condition 
which states that the rate of return on bonds, r , equals the rate of return to investing 
in R&D. The R&D rate of return equals the profit rate, Appi , plus the rate of capital 
gain or loss, AA pp& . 
 
2.4 Decentralized Contract Bargaining 
In this period, firm j  producing final goods and firm i  producing intermediate 
goods bargain over the franchising contract ( xp , f ) simultaneously. 
    The division of the rent between firm j  producing final goods and firm i  
producing intermediate goods, using Eq. (21) and Eq. (23), is obtained by maximizing 
the following Nash product 
fp x ,
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0Π  is the profit of firm j  which is constant when the bargaining breaks down, 
namely, the minimum profit of the final goods firm. 0pi  is the profit of firm i  
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which is constant when the bargaining breaks down, namely, the minimum profit of 
the intermediate goods firm. That is to say, if the bargaining breaks down, the 
downstream and upstream firms will mark up their prices by marginal cost, 
respectively.6 θ  describes the bargaining power of firm j  and lies in the interval 
[ ]1,0 . With 0=θ , the model indicates that the intermediate goods firm i  has full 
bargaining power to decide the intermediate goods price completely. To keep the 
analysis simple, we assume an identical bargaining power for all final goods firms 
with decentralized status. The same is true for all of the intermediate goods firms. 
    The decentralized bargaining means that there is no coordination between 
different bargaining units. All bargains take place simultaneously and the bargaining 
partners take all other intermediate goods prices and franchise fees as given. 
According to the Nash bargaining solutions that are derived by maximizing Eq. 
(29), firm j  and firm i  select an optimal franchise fee and intermediate price as 
follows 
wp x =  (30) 
n
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Eqs. (30) and (31) describe the optimal bargaining contract in a vertically connected 
imperfectly competitive market structure. Eq. (30) is the pricing rule for intermediate 
goods, resulting from competition between the final goods firm and the intermediate 
goods firm, with both firms simultaneously engaging in optimization. The bargaining 
contract in our model is unlike the traditional franchise contract, in which the final 
goods firm does not have any bargaining power to determine the contract’s content. 
The prices of the intermediate goods are equal to marginal cost which is unrelated to 
the bargaining power. This is an efficient result. Because the aggregate rent/franchise 
fee is maximized by setting the prices of the intermediate goods equal to their 
marginal cost, this result is interpreted as stemming from the negotiations between the 
intermediate goods firm and the final goods firm or the competition between the 
upstream and downstream industries. They obtain the maximum aggregate rent at first 
and then extract the extra rent, respectively, according to their bargaining power 
through the franchise fee. This result, which characterizes the interaction of firms in 
this market structure, reflects the economic consequence that double marginalization 
does not occur. This is a vertical integration outcome through franchise contract 
bargaining. Unlike traditional models, in this paper the prices of intermediate goods 
are determined by negotiation, the intermediate goods firms charge a price based on 
marginal cost and not on markup to the final goods firms and then extract the profit 
through the franchise fee (Eq. (31)). Since vertical integration takes place, an 
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inelasticity demand function of intermediate goods appears. Inside the square brackets 
on the right-hand side of Eq. (31) is the corporate income of firm j  per unit of final 
good. The optimal franchise fee depends on the bargaining power θ . Firm i  will 
extract all the rent if firm j  has no bargaining power ( 0=θ ). Similarly, the rent will 
vanish if firm i  has no bargaining power ( 1=θ ). 
Substituting Eq. (30) into the consumption goods price, Eq. (20), is given 
respectively as 
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Then, by substituting the results, Eqs. (30)-(32), into Eqs. (21) and (23), the 
profits can be written as 
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where the subscript 0 denotes the value of the bargaining breakdown. If firm j  is 
weaker than firm i  in terms of the bargaining power of the franchising contract, the 
rent will be distributed more to the patent-holder in the intermediate goods market. 
    Since we would like to analyze the global economy, we assume that the numbers 
of firms in the intermediate goods and final goods markets are the same for the 
economics of the bargaining and the breakdown in negotiations, mm =0 , nn =0 . 
Furthermore, the R&D activities take place in the first period of the game structure, 
namely, the government’s expenditure on R&D activities takes place first. We then 
assume that ss =0 , 
xx ττ =0 , yy ττ =0 . Therefore, Eqs. (33) and (34) are rewritten as 
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Moreover, by substituting Eq. (32) into the aggregate consumption price index, 
Eq. (12), is given respectively as 
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2.5 Government 
The government cannot borrow and thus satisfies the budget constraint  
AA
x
y wLvvswLGSmnxnxnm )1(1 −+=+=+− ττ α  (36) 
where mnxnxnm xy ττ
α +−1  is total tax revenues, AvswLS =  is the subsidy to defray 
the R&D cost of the firms, and AwLvG )1( −=  is government expenditure to employ 
labor in the R&D sector. In considering the decomposition of government 
expenditures from the upstream and downstream industries, mnxxτ , and nxnm y
1−ατ , 
we assume 
Ay wLsvgnxnm ))1(1(1 −−=−ατ  (36a) 
A
x wLsvgmnx ))1(1)(1( −−−=τ  (36b) 
where the parameter 10 << g  is the share of government expenditure financed by 
tax revenues from the final goods market and g−1  is the share of the government 
expenditure financed by tax revenues from the intermediate goods market. We 
consider that the parameters ( g , s , v ) are fixed and the vector of tax rates must 
adjust endogenously. This will allow our results to easily show how the government’s 
R&D subsidy policy and the government’s R&D activities affect the dynamics of 
growth. 
 
3. Market Equilibrium with a Fixed Subsidy Rate 
To determine the aggregate dynamics of this economy, we impose two conditions: 
labor market clearing and the final goods market. The labor market equilibrium 
condition states that total labor demand is equal to total labor supply, i.e., the optimal 
allocation of the given supply of labor ( L ) to the three sectors, LLLL RGx =++ , 
and that labor is perfectly mobile across the intermediate goods sector and the 
blueprint industry. Since the quantity of labor allocated to the intermediate goods 
sector is xx mnlL =  and that allocated to the R&D industry is nnLA &= , the labor 
market equilibrium condition will be rewritten as 
L
n
nLx =+
&
 (37) 
    Next, by combining Eq. (3) with yc =  and xlx = , and considering the 
clearing condition for the final goods market in the symmetric equilibrium, we have 
xLnYC
1−
==
α
 (38) 
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3.1 General Equilibrium Dynamics 
The macroeconomic model is represented by 
    
P
P
r
C
C &&
−−= ρ  (9) 
ααττ
σ
σ
−−++
−
=
11))((
1
nnwP y
x
 (35) 
ααττ
σσ
σθθθ −−++
−




−
−
−−=Π 110 ))((
1
11)
1
)1(( nnw
m
YY y
x
 (33a) 
ααττ
σσ
σθθθpi −−++
−




−
−
−+−= 110 ))((
1
11)
1
)1(()1( nnw
n
YY y
x
 (34a) 
n
wsvpA
)1( −
=  (26) 
A
A
A p
p
p
r
&
+=
pi
 (28) 
R
x
y wLsvmnxnxnm ))1(1(1 −−=+− ττ α  (36) 
Ay wLsvgnxnm ))1(1(1 −−=−ατ  (36a) 
A
x wLsvgmnx ))1(1)(1( −−−=τ  (36b) 
L
n
nLx =+
&
 (37) 
xLnYC
1−
==
α
 (38)7 
Assume that a vector of tax rates ( yτ , xτ ) is endogenous. Using Eq. (38) and the 
labor market equilibrium condition ( xA LLL −= ), Eqs. (36a) and (36b) may be 
rewritten as  
x
x
y Ln
LLwsvg
1
)())1(1(
−
−−−
=
α
τ  (36c) 
x
xx
L
LLwsvg )())1(1)(1( −−−−
=τ   (36d) 
Substituting Eqs. (36c) and (36d) into Eq. (35), we obtain 
wn
L
LLsvLP
x
xx α
σ
σ
−
−−−+
−
=
1)))(1(1(
1
 (39) 
By multiplying Eq. (39) by nsv )1( − , we obtain  
                                                 
7
 Eq. (38) is the resource constraint of the economy (see Appendix A). 
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P
LLsvL
nL
n
svp
xx
x
A )))(1(1(
1)1( 1
−−−+
−−
=
−α
σ
σ
 (40) 
Differentiating Eq. (40) with respect to time 
    )))(1(1(
)1()2(
xx
x
x
x
A
A
LLsvL
Lsv
P
P
L
L
n
n
p
p
−−−+
−
−++−=
&&&&&
α  (41) 
Substituting Eqs. (35), (36c), (36d) and (38) into Eq. (34) and dividing by Eq. 
(26), we obtain 
    
x
xx
xx
A L
LLsvLLL
svp
)))(1(1()
1
)1(()1()1()1(
1 0 −−−+




−
−
−+−
−−
=
σ
σθθθ
σ
pi
 (42) 
where ρ
σ
σ
σ
σ 1
)1(
1)1(0 −+
−
−−
= L
sv
svLx  is the quantity of labor employed in the 
intermediate goods market in a successively imperfectly competitive economy.  
    Substituting Eqs. (41), (42a) and (28) into Eq. (9), we obtain 
ρα
σ
σθθ
σ
σ
σθθ
σσ
θ
σ
θ
−
−+−−
−
−+−+
−
−
−
−−
−−
+
−
−
−
−
+
−−
−−−
+
−
−
=
x
x
x
x
x
x
xx
LsvLsv
Lsv
L
L
n
n
L
LL
sv
sv
LL
sv
svL
C
C
)1())1(1(
)1()2(
)
1
)1(()1()1(
)1(1
)
1
)1((
1
1
)1()1(
))1(1)(1(
1
1
0
0
&&&
&
  
 (43) 
Differentiating Eq. (38) with respect to time 
x
x
L
L
n
n
C
C &&&
+−= )1(α  (44) 
 
Proposition 1. There is a necessary and sufficient condition that leads the economy to 
indeterminacy. A high equilibrium and a low equilibrium in the economy will take 
place. 
 
From Eqs. (43), (44) and (37), we find the dynamic equation for xL  
LL
sv
sv
LLL
sv
svL
LsvLsv
LsvL
x
xxx
x
xx
0
02
)
1
)1(()1(
)1(1
   
)1()
1
)1(()1(
)1()()1()(
)1())1(1(
)1()1(
−
−
−
−
−−
+






−−
−
−
−+
−
−−−−
+−=
−+−−
−−
σ
σθθ
ρσ
σ
σθθθσθθσ
σ &
  
  (45) 
Assume that 





−−
−
−
−+
−
−−−−
=Ω ρσ
σ
σθθθσθ )1()
1
)1(()1(
)1()()1( 0
xLL
sv
sv
, and 
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LL
sv
sv
x
0)
1
)1(()1(
)1(1
−
−
−
−
−−
=Γ
σ
σθθ . 
In the steady state 0=xL& , we obtain 
)(2
)(42
θσ
θσ
−
Γ−−Ω±Ω−
=xL  (46) 
Eq. (46) indicates that the economy exhibits an indeterminate solution if 0<Ω , 
0>Γ . The conditions are as follows 
0)1()
1
)1(()1(
)1()()1( 0 <−−
−
−
−+
−
−−−− ρσ
σ
σθθθσθ xLL
sv
sv
 (47) 
0)
1
)1(()1(
)1(1 0 >
−
−
−
−
−− LL
sv
sv
xσ
σθθ  (48) 
According to Eq. (45), the first-order condition and second-order condition are as 
follows 
0)1()
1
)1(()1(
)1()()1()(2 0
<
>






−−
−
−
−+
−
−−−−
+−=
∂
∂ ρσ
σ
σθθθσθθσ xx
x
x LL
sv
svL
L
L&
 (49) 
0)(22
2
>−=
∂
∂ θσ
x
x
L
L&
  (50) 
Eqs. (49) and (50) imply that there are two equilibria for xL  in the steady state. One 
is stable, namely, the low equilibrium ( xL
( ), and the other is unstable, namely, the high 
equilibrium ( xL
) ). 
 
3.2 Steady State Analysis 
In the generalized case, the economy is under indeterminate equilibrium, that is to say, 
the conditions, Eqs. (47) and (48), are satisfied. In the steady state 0=xL& , and by 
totally differentiating Eq. (45), the results of the comparative static state are as 
follows 
0)
1
1())1(
)1(1()(2
1 0
<
>




−
+−×
−
−−
+×
Ω+−
=∂
∂
xxx
x
x LLL
sv
svL
L
L
σ
σ
θσθ
 (51) 
0)1(
)1(1)
11
(1)
11
(
)1(
)1(
)(2
1
0
2
<
>












−
−
−−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
×
−
−
×
Ω+−
−
=
∂
∂
xxx
x
x
LL
sv
svLL
sv
L
Ls
L
σσ
σ
θ
θ
σσ
σ
θ
θ
θ
θσ
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 (52) 
0)1(
)1(1)
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(1)
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(
)1(
)1(
)(2
1
0
2
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


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

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−
−
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σ
σ
θ
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σ
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σ
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 (54) 
From Eq. (37), in the steady state the growth rates of innovation depend on the 
state of xL  such that 
xn LL
)(
−=γ  (55) 
otherwise 
xn LL
()
−=γ  (56) 
where nnn &=γ . Eq. (55) denotes the low balanced equilibrium growth rate of 
innovation and Eq. (56) the high balanced equilibrium growth rate of innovation. 
Hence, the effects of the fiscal and exogenous variables on the balanced equilibrium 
growth rate depend on Eqs. (51)-(54). In addition, the growth rate depends on the size 
of the population; this is the well-known, although controversial, scale effect of 
R&D-based endogenous growth models.8 
 
Proposition 2. The fiscal policies of the government, direct expenditure on R&D 
activities and subsidies to defray the R&D costs of firms, have entirely different effects 
on the economy according to whether there is a high balanced growth path or a low 
balanced growth path. In addition, the bargaining power between the firms producing 
intermediate goods and final goods also has reverse effects on the economy. 
 
When the economy is in a low equilibrium where labor is employed by 
intermediate goods firms, xL
(
, the denominator of the first fraction on the right-hand 
                                                 
8
 Jones (1995). 
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side of Eqs. (51)-(54), is negative, i.e., 0)(2 <Ω+− xLθσ . On the other hand, when 
the economy is in a high equilibrium where labor is employed by intermediate goods 
firms, xL
)
, the denominator of the first fraction on the right-hand side of Eqs. (51)-(54) 
is positive, i.e., 0)(2 >Ω+− xLθσ . Hence, it is well known that the effects of the 
exogenous parameters are entirely reversed between the high balanced growth path 
economy and low balanced growth path economy, regardless of whether the values 
inside the square brackets are positive or negative. 
 
4. Special Case 
In order to obtain definite results, in regard to Eqs. (51)-(53), we make some 
legitimate assumption as follows 
0)
1
1( xx LL
−
+<
σ
σ
 (57) 
L
L
sv
sv x
0
)1(
)1(1
<
−
−−
σ
 (58) 
Eq. (57) assumes that after bargaining the quantity of labor employed by intermediate 
goods firms ( xL ) will not be more than double the quantity of labor employed when 
bargaining breaks down ( 0xL ).9 Besides, Eq. (58) assumes that the ratio of labor 
employed by intermediate goods firms when bargaining breaks down ( LLx0 ) is more 
than just some rate.10 
    According to Eqs. (57) and (58), we obtain definite results which are interpreted 
in the following sections. 
 
4.1 High Balanced Growth Path Economy 
When the economy is in a low equilibrium where labor is employed by intermediate 
goods firms, xL
(
, the denominator of the first fraction on the right-hand side of Eqs. 
(51)-(53) is negative, i.e., 0)(2 <Ω+− xLθσ . At this time, the economy has a high 
balanced growth path ( nγ) ). Therefore, the effects of the parameters on the economic 
growth are as follows 
0<
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
θθ
γ xn L
()
 (59) 
                                                 
9
 If 12=σ  (Wang and Wen, 2008), we obtain 01.2
xx
LL < . 
10
 If 15.0=s  (Şener, 2008), 5.0=v , and we obtain 
L
L
x
0
11.0 <  which is feasible for our study. 
 18 
0<
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
s
L
s
xn
()γ
 (60) 
0>
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
v
L
v
xn
()γ
 (61) 
Eq. (59) illustrates that increasing the bargaining power of intermediate goods firms 
will increase the high balanced growth rate of innovation. That is to say, the 
intermediate goods firm plays an important role in a high balanced growth path 
economy in boosting the rate of economic growth. In addition, Eq. (60) indicates that 
the government’s policy of subsidizing the R&D cost of the firms has a negative 
effect on the high balanced growth rate. In other words, the government raises the rate 
of the subsidy which will cause the growth rate to slow down. Moreover, if the 
government directly increases the expenditure on the R&D activities, it will decrease 
the growth rate, too (Eq. (61)). Therefore, the government’s expenditure on R&D will 
crowd out the private R&D activities. 
 
4.2 Low Balanced Growth Path Economy 
When the economy is in a high equilibrium where labor is employed by intermediate 
goods firms, xL
)
, the denominator of the first fraction on the right-hand side of Eqs. 
(51)-(53) is positive, 0)(2 >Ω+− xLθσ . At this time, the economy is on a low 
balanced growth path ( nγ( ). Therefore, the effects of the parameters on the economic 
growth are as follows 
0>
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
θθ
γ xn L
)(
 (62) 
0>
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
s
L
s
xn
)(γ
 (63) 
0<
∂
∂
−=
∂
∂
v
L
v
xn
)(γ
 (64) 
Eq. (62) illustrates that an increase in the bargaining power of final goods firms will 
increase the low balanced growth rate of innovation. That is to say, the final goods 
firms play an important role in a low balanced growth path economy to enhance the 
rate of economic growth. In addition, Eq. (63) indicates that the effect of a 
government’s subsidy policy on the R&D cost of the firms in a low balanced growth 
path economy is positive. In other words, a government that raises the ratio of the 
subsidy to the R&D cost of the firms will cause the growth rate to speed up. Moreover, 
if the government directly increases its expenditure on R&D activities, it will increase 
the growth rate, too (Eq. (64)). Hence, the government plays an important role in 
enhancing the rate of economic growth, and the policies on R&D activities are helpful 
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in a low balanced growth path economy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we take a new look at the effects of a government’s subsidy policy and 
its R&D activities in an R&D-based growth model. The government not only 
subsidizes the R&D cost of the firms but also engages in R&D activities, and a 
specific tax is levied on the firms that produce the final goods and intermediate goods 
to finance the expenditure. 
    We find that the economy is characterized by two balanced equilibrium growth 
rates which comprise a high balanced growth equilibrium and a low balanced growth 
equilibrium. In a high growth rate economy the government’s subsidy policy and the 
R&D activities will crowd out the private R&D activities, and hence the fiscal policy 
is of no help to the economic growth. In other words, the intermediate goods firms 
play an important role in driving the economic growth, and the stronger the 
bargaining power of the intermediate goods firms is, the more the economy grows. On 
the contrary, in a low growth path economy the government that directly engages in 
R&D activities plays an important role in economic growth. The fiscal policies of the 
government have a positive effect on the economic growth.  
    This paper finds evidence of entirely different effects on a high growth rate 
economy and a low growth rate economy. In different economies, the government and 
the firms that manufacture intermediate goods and final goods play different roles in 
the process of economic growth.  
 
Appendix A 
From household’s budget constraint 
PCmwLnrppnnp AAA −Π++=+ &&  (A.1) 
Substituting the zero profit condition: AA wLsvnp )1( −=& , labor market equilibrium: 
LLL Ax =+ , and non-arbitrage condition: 
A
A
A p
p
p
r
&
+=
pi
 into Eq. (A.1) 
PCmLLwnp
p
p
p
pnwLsv AxA
A
A
A
AA −Π++++=+− )()()1(
&
&
pi
 (A.2) 
Rewriting Eq. (A.2) to 
    PCmLLwnwLsv AxA −Π+++=− )()1( pi  (A.3) 
Substituting pi  and Π , namely, Eqs. (33a) and (34a), into Eq. (A.3), we obtain  
PCLLwnnwYwLsv Axy
x
A −++++
−
=−
−− )())((
1
1)1( 11 ααττ
σ
 (A.4) 
Since the taxes are endogenous, substituting the government budget constraint 
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x
A
y Ln
wLsvg
1
))1(1(
−
−−
=
α
τ , and 
x
Ax
L
wLsvg ))1(1)(1( −−−
=τ  into Eq. (A.4), we obtain 
PCLLwwn
L
LsvLYwLsv Ax
x
Ax
A −++
−−+
−
=−
− )())1(1(
1
1)1( 1 α
σ
 (A.5) 
Owing to xLnY
1−
=
α
,  
PCLYnwwLsvYnwLsv AAA −++−−+
−
=−
−− )()))1(1((
1
1)1( 11 αα
σ
 
 (A.6) 
Rewriting to  
PCwLwLsvwYnwLsv AAA −+−−
−
+
−
=−
− ))1(1(
1
1
1
)1( 1
σσ
σ α
 (A.7) 
Substituting wn
L
wLsvLP
x
Ax α
σ
σ
−
−−+
−
=
1))1(1(
1
 into (A.7), we obtain 
wCnwYn αα
σ
σ
σ
σ
−−
−
−
−
=
11
11
0  (A.8) 
Hence, we obtain the resource constraint as follows 
CY =  (A.9) 
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